The Somali media, diaspora communities and the concept of conflict re-creation by Osman, Idil
JOMEC Journal
Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
The Somali Media, Diaspora communities
and the concept of conflict re-creation
Cardiff University
Email: AbdiosmanI@cardiff.ac.uk
Idil Osman
Keywords 
migration
diaspora
conflict 
somalia 
media 
globalisation
 
Published by Cardiff University Press
	
	
 https://publications.cardiffuniversitypress.org/index.php/JOMEC  @JOMECjournal	
Abstract 
Somalia has for more than two decades been in a perpetual state of conflict and more 
than a million Somalis have fled the initial civil war. They have formed a substantial 
diaspora community and have set up their own websites and TV stations to remain 
engaged with the happenings of their homeland. Diasporic media is often hailed as a 
medium that allows immigrants to maintain their identity in their host country as well as 
providing a platform to sustain ties with their homeland. However, if these ties are being 
maintained with a homeland that is in a state of conflict, there is very much a possibility 
that the dynamics of the conflict will be transported and re-created amongst the 
diaspora audiences. This article illustrates how diasporic media can re-create conflict, 
through a theoretically developed and empirically informed argument that provides three 
distinctly analytical approaches, referred to as the three politics of non-recognition, 
solidarity and mobilisation. The article argues that diasporic media is more complex than 
existing scholarship has demonstrated and that there is a need to broaden the scope of 
current academic debates concerning the interplay between diasporic media, 
transnationalism and conflict. 
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Introduction 
Diasporas have existed in one form or 
another for centuries, but with the rise of 
new patterns of conflict, the increased 
speed of communication and mobility 
and the proliferation of cultural and 
political boundaries from the latter 
decades of the 20th century, their 
importance with respect to conflict has 
gained weight. From the Tamil Tigers in 
Europe financing terrorist activities in 
their home territories and American 
Jewish groups supporting right-wing 
extremists in Israel, to German Croats 
supporting the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
diaspora groups have come to play a 
crucial role in feeding and prolonging 
conflicts (Demmers 2002). According to 
the World Bank report on this subject in 
2003 (World Bank 2003), if a country 
which has recently ended a conflict has 
a large diaspora in the West, its risk that 
the conflict will resume is sharply 
increased as diasporas tend to be more 
extreme than the populations they have 
left behind.  
The Somali diaspora is particularly well-
positioned to engage with homeland 
activities. Since fleeing from civil war in 
1991, the Somali diaspora has integrated 
into the West, used the opportunities of 
better infrastructure and technologies 
presented by its new environments and 
thereby attained information vital to 
remaining connected to its homeland 
(Issa-Salwe 2011). In this, it has become 
part of what Appadurai refers to as the 
‘emerging new global cultural ecumene’ 
(Appadurai 1990: 5). The Somali diaspora 
has established diasporic media, which 
is often used and remediated by the 
domestic media in Somalia. This means 
that domestic Somali media can act as 
an echo-chamber for views that originate 
from outside the country. It also warrants 
diasporic media a certain level of 
influence and allows them to occupy a 
hegemonic position within the Somali 
media landscape (Gaas, Hansen and 
Berry 2012: 6).  
This article sheds light on diasporic 
media’s potential to re-create homeland 
tensions and conflicts amongst diaspora 
communities and seeks to broaden 
current scholarly debate surrounding 
diaspora communities and their media. 
Current scholarship often focuses on 
diasporic media’s importance in 
maintaining ties of kinship, homeland 
relations and the receiving of information 
in the community’s language. Whilst the 
research that this article is based on has 
reconfirmed these notions, it has also 
shown that diasporic media is doing 
much more, necessitating an all-
encompassing, holistic research 
approach to deepen our understanding 
of diasporic media capabilities. 
 
The Somali diaspora and globalisation  
The Somali diaspora maintains links with 
family members back home primarily 
through economic support, but is also 
active in the general reconstruction of 
the country. It makes a major 
contribution to the Somali economy, 
sustaining livelihoods through 
remittances, humanitarian assistance 
and participation in recovery and 
reconstruction efforts (Menkhaus 2009). 
It is commonly acknowledged that the 
most successful migrant businesses 
arise in the crevices created by 
transnationalism – for example, shipping 
and cargo companies, import and export 
firms and labour contractors (Glick, 
Schiller et al. 1995. This is also true for 
the establishment of the money transfer 
companies known as ‘hawilad’. The 
hawilad is an informal system of value 
transfer that operates in almost every 
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part of the world (Horst 2008). It is run by 
Somalis and mainly used by Somalis; 
both for remittance-sending and 
business transactions. The recent 
clampdown by US and UK banks has 
therefore caused much concern since it 
is anticipated to have devastating effects 
on the millions of Somalis who rely on 
remittances to survive.  
The close-knit relation that the diaspora 
Somalis have with their homeland makes 
diasporic media a vehicle for direct 
participation in the mediated commun-
ications process, as well as for the 
extension of the voices of Somali 
diaspora groups. Diasporic media has 
given them a platform to inform one 
another of Somalia, its changing political 
dynamics, humanitarian conditions and 
warring ideological affiliations. It has 
presented an opportunity for the Somali 
Diaspora to become what Fathi (1979 
cited in Sreberny-Mohamadi and 
Mohamadi 1994: 4) refers to as a ‘public 
coming into being’ and to voice its own 
opinion. Whilst the Somali Diaspora has 
grown adept at adapting technologies to 
its situational needs (Issa-Salwe 2011), 
communicative technology has been 
used to articulate placeless imaginings 
of identity (Gilroy 2000). When this 
‘coming into being’ unfolds in a 
fragmented environment, especially as in 
the Somali case, diasporic identity 
becomes what Paul Gilroy refers to as ‘a 
question of power and authority when 
groups seek to realise themselves in 
political form’ (Gilroy 2000: 99). Moreover, 
if, as McLuhan famously argued, the 
‘global village’ makes of us nobodies 
desperate for a sense of identity, this 
process may be all the more intense, as 
people seek to retrieve who they used to 
be as a protection of their fading 
identities and the old sensibility, values 
and enmity prevail over democratic 
awareness and commitment (McLuhan 
et al. 1995). The same communication 
technology provides platforms for 
dominance to those who have access to 
better technological infrastructure and 
democratic environments. Diasporic 
media in this context have become a 
powerful tool as it enables diaspora 
communities to negotiate and exert 
authority that carries political, financial, 
human and social capital. The diaspora 
is both informed and motivated by 
discourses and ideologies produced at 
the homeland ‘centre’ (Demmers 2007), 
and this can influence it to engage with 
homeland activities. As Somalia is still 
marred by conflict, reliance on the 
diaspora has gradually become more 
significant, especially in relation to 
funding warring clans in the Somali 
territories (Horst and Gaas 2008). It is 
this reliance, coupled with the 
communicative opportunities that 
diasporic media provide, which produces 
the concept I refer to as ‘diasporated 
conflicts’. In sum, diasporated conflicts 
are conflicts where there is a dominant 
involvement from and reliance on the 
diaspora, enabled and empowered by 
diasporic media.  
According to scholars such as Chandler, 
Kaldor and Keane, the key point of the 
globalised world is that territory is no 
longer especially significant (Chandler 
2009). Due to globalisation, we no longer 
live in a territorialised world where we 
are mapped in terms of bounded 
political communities with clear points of 
connection between states and citizen-
subjects (Chandler 2009; Ruggie 1993; 
Scholte 2002). Whilst this may be true for 
societies that have submitted to 
‘civilising processes’ in Norbert Elias’s 
terms (1939), arguably, for societies that 
have not, connections between citizen-
subjects abroad and territorially-based 
political communities not just limited to 
the state are very much alive. At the 
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same time, the intensification of 
worldwide social relations linking distant 
localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many thousands of miles 
away, and vice versa (Giddens 1991), 
means that diasporic media is (very 
possibly) enabling transnational connect-
ions. Technologically-engaged diaspora 
communities can be seen as networks 
which constitute the new social 
morphology of our societies (Castells 
1996), making it more likely for global 
clusters of groups to exist. Through 
diasporic media, diaspora communities 
maintain local identities and reproduce 
localised nationalisms transnationally. 
For diaspora communities negotiating 
their identities through this prism of 
globalisation and amidst sentiments of 
placelessness, national belonging is often 
rediscovered through distance and 
feelings of difference (Trandafoiu 2013). 
As such, it is highly likely for diaspora 
communities to re-embrace their 
homeland and all that comes with it.  
Globalisation has created possibilities for 
global democratic progress as well as for 
the globalisation of violence and conflict. 
Somali diaspora communities settled in 
the West have the advantage of living in 
technologically and democratically 
advanced environments, which puts 
them in a position to engage with 
homeland politics and vie for 
prominence amongst the hegemonic 
elite. The most powerful tool that enables 
this prominence is the financial support 
they give to political actors at clan level. 
According to Horst and Gaas, ‘Tensions 
and conflicts between sub-clans are 
faced by relatives and friends directly 
and the level of influence diaspora 
support can have on the outcome of 
these conflicts is much greater’ (Horst 
and Gaas 2008: 16). Horst and Gaas 
elaborate further, stating that ‘clan 
leaders can expect financial support 
from clan-members in the diaspora and 
manpower from clan members in 
Somalia and these disputes often lead to 
the two clans in question taking up arms 
against each other’ (Horst and Gaas 
2008: 17). Often both clans would be 
mobilising each other in Somalia, which 
would have significant implications for 
both clans’ members in the diaspora and 
their local relationships with each other. 
According to Horst and Gaas, funds sent 
to support clan conflict have been 
estimated to have been between 
$500,000 and $5million over the past 
two decades, and have been used for 
fighters to be paid and weaponry to be 
bought (Horst and Gaas 2008). As such, 
the diaspora is a significant contributor 
to the cycle that is part of the 
phenomenon that Collier refers to as the 
‘conflict trap’ (2003). In addition to clan 
support, diaspora Somalis have also sent 
remittances to Islamist groups that they 
ideologically support. The emergence of 
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 
was largely enabled by the financial 
means of diaspora members (Menkhaus 
2007) Diaspora support, in fact, enabled 
the rapid expansion of the ICU as they 
took control of the whole of Mogadishu 
and are considered to have brought 
some semblance of order in less than 6 
months (Horst and Gaas 2008). 
Furthermore, posting information about 
their movement and its development on 
Somali websites helped to recruit many 
Somalis from the diaspora to join the 
ICU (Horst and Gaas 2008).  
 
Diasporic media and the concept of 
conflict re-creation 
The collapse of the state fractured 
Somali society and its common bonds of 
nationhood. In their place came 
factionalised enmities and conflicts 
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based on traditional clan alliances. The 
conflict perpetuated existing social 
inequalities and unequally shared 
resources. It also drew a foray of 
international actors, each with vested 
interests, engaging and intervening in 
multifaceted ways, including western-
centric approaches that were often 
incompatible with existing local politics, 
social norms and cultures. These various 
groups have engaged diasporic media to 
further their political ambitions, clan 
interests and ideological causes. The 
diaspora communities are therefore not 
only receiving information on progress 
and happenings in their homeland; they 
are also encouraged to engage with the 
dynamics of the conflict. Between 1989 
and 2004, 94% of worldwide violent 
conflicts revolved around inter-group or 
group-state disputes (Harbom and 
Wallensteen 2005). As identity groups are 
at the core of most contemporary 
conflicts (Demmers 2007), analysing how 
diaspora groups are invited to participate 
in conflicts through diasporic media is 
especially important in modern times. 
Conflict re-creation becomes a 
possibility when the sentiments and 
dynamics forming the root causes of the 
conflict are reproduced through the 
media. The Somali conflict is rooted in 
poverty and unequal access to 
resources, clannism and international 
community interventions. When the 
media re-enacts the silencing of the 
poor and marginalised sections of 
society, it reinforces the injustices 
already established by the conflict. 
Equally, when media platforms 
reproduce existing clan structures and 
alliances, they can encourage 
relationships of connection with or 
disconnection from other human beings, 
laying the foundation for the practice of 
mediated inclusion and exclusion. When 
this is applied to existing clan tensions 
and conflicts, it can reproduce clannism 
practices that have been part of the 
Somali conflict’s root cause. The 
mediated operationalisation of conflict 
root causes that encourage the 
enactment of existing conflict dynamics 
can lead to the conflict being re-created 
through the media. 
 
A note on method 
To examine the extent of diasporic 
media involvement in the Somali conflict 
and the role(s) they play with regards to 
conflict re-creation, an overview of all 
existing Somali websites and television 
stations was carried out between 2012 
and 2013. This overview of 748 websites 
and 10 television stations identified the 
conflict dynamics that had the potential 
to be reproduced. These were 
conceptualised as three overarching and 
analytically distinct forms of politics: the 
politics of non-recognition, the politics of 
solidarity and the politics of mobilisation, 
which engage with the conditions of 
possibility of the Somali conflict.  
In order to examine how these politics 
may variously be at work or contribute to 
the re-creation of conflict within and 
through Somali diasporic media, I 
conducted an extensive content and 
discourse analysis of the 748 websites 
and 10 television stations between May 
and September 2013. Data from a 
selection of key content analysis 
variables are presented here, including 
the frequency of representation of 
prominent and marginalised social 
actors, solidaristic invocations in audio-
visual news coverage and current affairs 
material (including documentaries, talk 
shows and debates), clan alignment in 
advertising, and possibilities for audience 
interactivity through the ‘sharing’ of 
media content online. As the findings 
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show very few differences between 
television and website representations, 
the presentation of this data has, largely, 
been combined. Alongside the content 
analysis findings, some illustrative 
examples from a wider Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) study are included which 
pay particular attention to lexical choices 
used to represent ideological 
dispositions and alignments. 
 
Politics of non-recognition  
The politics of non-recognition takes its 
cue from Taylor’s ‘politics of recognition’ 
in emphasising the media’s central role 
in contemporary times in silencing the 
most marginalised and powerless 
members of society. In today’s 
mediatised societies, the media is 
arguably the principal means by which 
cultural differences and agendas can be 
acknowledged and recognised (Cottle 
2006), putting minorities in a position 
where they can be misrecognised or 
devalued or worse, not recognised at all. 
The media operates in fields structured 
by dominance (Cottle 2006). The key 
issue with regards to the politics of non-
recognition is the absence of a given 
content in the media, since what does 
not exist in the media does not exist in 
the public mind (Castells 2007). The 
mediatised silencing of discourses and 
issues relevant to minorities and 
marginalised sections of society 
inevitably reinforces the cognitive 
manifestation of existing marginalisation 
that is often prevalent in conflict 
environments. 
The content analysis findings used here 
focus upon the representation of social 
actors and, first, highlight the most 
marginalised groups in the Somali 
conflict, including women, youth, the 
economically marginalised and minority 
clans. These groups, overall, were also 
marginalised in the Somali diasporic 
media, appearing far less often and less 
prominently than males, those identified 
with majority clans, elites (such as 
politicians), or those associated with the 
international community. Of the 
marginalised groups, women were the 
most represented, as 25% of diasporic 
media content featured women’s issues. 
Marginalised social actors Number of appearances 
Percentage of 
appearances 
Women 49 25.8% 
Human rights activists 36 18.9% 
Youth 30 15.8% 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 22 11.6% 
Children 13 6.8% 
Women’s rights activists 13 6.8% 
Disabled people 11 5.8% 
Orphans 6 3.2% 
Elderly people 3 1.6% 
Homeless people 3 1.6% 
Fishermen 3 1.6% 
Street children 1 0.5% 
Beggars 0 0% 
Street vendors 0 0% 
Total 190 100% 
Table 1:  Marginalised Social Actors 
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This may be illustrative of some of the 
progress that has been made by the 
efforts of the international community 
and Somali women’s organisations to 
promote women’s prominence in Somali 
society. Efforts such as the women-only 
‘6th clan’ which responds to the 5 
traditional male-led clans that dominate 
Somali politics, and the 30% quota of 
seats designated to women in 
Parliament as set out in the 2012 draft 
constitution, are notable examples 
(although this has not, to date, been 
implemented, since only 5% of the 
Somali Parliament is currently female) 
(World Bank 2013). However, as the chart 
shows, women’s rights activists feature 
far less often in the media (only 6.8% of 
the marginalised social actors 
represented), which suggests that the 
media is much more interested in 
representing women in their traditional 
roles, rather than as actors with political, 
social and economic potential within the 
Somali society.  
The social actors who were most often 
represented in the media were male, and 
especially males featured in a political 
context underpinned by clan-centricity: 
Social Actor 
Number of 
appearances 
Percentage of 
appearances 
Somali president 106 14.4% 
Clan members 82 11.1% 
Clan poets 78 10.6% 
Regional officials appointed by regional 
administrations 77 10.4% 
Local officials appointed by regional 
administrations 70 9.5% 
Clan elders 66 8.9% 
Prime minister 56 7.6% 
Cabinet members 52 7.0% 
Artists engaging in clan discourse 49 6.6% 
Parliamentarians 41 5.6% 
Female clan members 27 3.7% 
Youth clan members 27 3.7% 
Minority clan members 2 0.3% 
Minority clan elders 2 0.3% 
Total 738 100.0% 
Table 2: Prominently represented social actors 
Here we can see the deep-rootedness of 
clannism through the popularity of clan-
related sources, which includes the 
Somali President as he too has been 
selected based on clan politics. But we 
can also take note of how under-
represented minority clans are, with their 
members and elders appearing a total of 
only 4 times. 
The continuation of male dominance in 
Somali affairs at the expense of the 
Somali women is likely to remain 
unchallenged when the media 
perpetuate the silencing and 
misrecognition of women. Similarly, the 
sidelining of minority clans may 
propagate existing forms of 
marginalisation that have been part of 
the root cause of the conflict. These 
examples of the politics of non-
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recognition represent small but 
important elements in the reproduction 
of existing structures of dominance that 
underpin the conflict, and thus in 
providing the conditions of possibility for 
conflict re-creation. 
 
 
Solidarity categories Number of appearances 
Percentage of 
appearances 
Solidarity with clannism 68 34.7% 
Other 48 24.5% 
Solidarity for international engagement 38 19.4% 
Mobilising for clannism 21 10.7% 
No audio-visual material 12 6.1% 
Solidarity for marginalised groups 5 2.6% 
Mobilising on behalf of marginalised groups 3 1.5% 
Solidarity against poverty and unequal access to 
resources 1 0.5% 
Mobilising against poverty and unequal access to 
resources 0 0% 
Mobilising for international engagement 0 0% 
Total 196 100% 
 
Table 3: Solidarity exhibition in Somali diasporic media 
Politics of solidarity  
Solidarity in its broadest form has 
multiple meanings but essentially 
denotes a relation or unity between 
people, usually where the fellow feeling 
of a group takes shape from a shared 
ideal (Scholz 2007). Anderson (1991), in 
relation to nationalism, notes that it is 
simply not possible for every individual to 
know and directly engage with each 
other on an everyday basis, even in the 
smallest of nations. Yet there remains a 
feeling of being bound to one another, 
with mutual obligations and the 
expectation of solidarity from others. The 
politics of solidarity acquires new 
meaning when applied to transnational 
movements based on faith, perceived 
ethnicity, generation or cultural affinity - 
especially with respect to societies 
where ethnicity is more important 
and/or where the home state has 
collapsed. According to Anderson, under 
these conditions people tend to become 
more territorial and defensive of what 
they consider ‘belongs’ to them in 
collective cultural terms - a unifying 
force which is at the the same time 
exclusionary. In the context of state 
collapse, regional connections based on 
existing traditional structures such as the 
clan become more poignant. It is this 
transnational solidarity, constructed 
primarily around clan, rather than 
national, identity, which, I argue, is 
fortified by diasporic media. The Somali 
diaspora is dependent on the media for 
information (Issa-Salwe 2011: 56), but 
how the media decide to represent 
unfolding events can lead to judgements 
mediated through clan identity and 
loyalty. Through such events, people in 
the diaspora and in the homeland are 
invited to establish relations of 
connection and disconnection, practices 
of inclusion and exclusion and emotional 
attachments to others sharing clan 
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culture and values, based upon dignity, 
honour and pride.  
The production of the politics of 
solidarity in Somali diasporic media 
content was most commonly found 
within clannism. The table below 
illustrates that nearly 35% of all the news 
and current affairs audio-visual material 
that appeared online and on television 
exhibited solidarity with clannism: 
Material exhibiting solidarity for clannism 
appeared most frequently. When 
sentiments reinforcing clannism are 
reproduced in media content, it can 
cement clan allegiance and, as a 
consequence, a society without a 
common bond. Societal fragmentation is 
both reflected in and reproduced 
through mediatised pockets of clan 
clusters, each vying to further their 
interests and, in the process, producing 
the politics of solidarity that can re-
create conflict. 
Similar clannist alignment was found in 
the advertisements that appeared in 
Somali diasporic media: 
 
 
Advertising categories Number of appearances 
Percentage of 
appearances 
Clan/regionally linked 51 28.3% 
Other 50 27.8% 
Religious organisations and businesses 29 16.1% 
Websites/TV without advertising 27 15.0% 
International community 15 8.3% 
Somali NGOs, women’s groups, youth groups 5 2.8% 
Entertainment ads. i.e. concerts, sports etc. 3 1.7% 
Total 180 100% 
 
Table 4: Groups represented in Somali diasporic media advertising 
As we can see again, the largest number 
of advertisements that appeared on 
Somali media promoted goods and/or 
services that had a clan-based nature. It 
further exemplifies the entrenchment of 
clan solidarity to the detriment of a 
common bond of nationhood. 
 
Politics of mobilisation 
The politics of mobilisation is the 
mediated operationalisation of existing 
dispositions to provide human, financial 
and/or social capital. This could involve, 
for example, offering oneself as 
manpower, sending and raising funds 
and goods, raising awareness and/or 
rallying others to become involved. The 
media can reproduce the politics of 
mobilisation by calling for action and 
providing a platform to engage with and 
operationalise these dispositions. 
Stremlau and Price (2009) speak of the 
Kenyan 2008 post-election violence and 
how media narratives mirrored, enabled 
and exacerbated said violence during 
and after the elections. The authors 
outline how grievance, suspicion and 
beliefs about vote-rigging were the 
factors largely responsible for Kenyan 
post-election violence; sentiments 
advocated and instigated by the media 
as a key agent in public mobilisation. 
Similarly, in former Yugoslavia, Slobodan 
Milosevic sparked ethno-political conflict 
chiefly through the use of mass media. 
Milosevic took control of the most 
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influential Serbian media including 
television, radio and the largest 
newspapers in order to ensure popular 
support and political legitimacy for his 
causes among the Serbian public, 
leading to the mobilisation of hatred 
towards Albanians and the spreading of 
aggressive nationalism (Bozic-Robertson 
2004). 
The mobilisation of conflict-related 
dynamics was mostly found on Somali 
diasporic websites, including, 
importantly, the mechanism of social 
media sharing, meaning that website 
content can be shared on platforms 
such as Twitter, Facebook and Google+: 
 
 
Social media sharing 
 
 
Number of occurrences 
 
 
Percentage of occurrences 
Site facilitates sharing 104 66.2% 
Site does not facilitate 
sharing  
53 33.8% 
Total  157 100% 
 
Table 5: Media content sharing 
Of the 157 Somali diasporic websites 
included in the analysis, two-thirds 
allowed for content to be shared. Sharing 
is significant as it creates the possibility 
for content to appear on multiple 
platforms, to reach bigger audiences and 
thereby the potential to engage more 
people. Shared content calling for 
solidarity and support for an ongoing 
conflict, such as the fighting between the 
Ethiopian government and Somali 
liberation fighters in the Somali region of 
Ethiopia known as Ogaden, for example, 
goes beyond evoking solidarity, or a 
shared community of feeling, to actively 
encourage offline action to occur. The 
website Ogaden.com, for example, allows 
content-sharing and overtly supports the 
Ogaden clan (which is split into various 
political branches) and specifically 
advocates support for the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF) 
movement, which seeks secession from 
Ethiopia to form an independent state. In 
the following example, the call for direct 
engagement with conflict is very clear:  
Ethiopian Scorched-Earth Policy in 
Occupied Ogaden and the Liyu Police 
Militia 
Conceived and materialized 
exclusively for the prolongation of 
the Ethiopian Occupation of 
Ogaden, Liyu Police has recently 
played an active role in the 
implementation of the Ethiopian 
scorched-earth policy across the 
vast, Somali-speaking, Ogaden 
region. The role played by Liyu 
Police in the destruction of Ogaden 
and the Ogadeni society is revealed 
by a testimony paper composed by 
a number of recently defected 
former Liyu Police officers whereby 
are given details about atrocious 
incidents, dates and criminal 
perpetrators. Such is the extent of 
the horror and the evildoings that 
the perpetrators have to be 
persecuted wherever at anytime… 
The call for action is buttressed through 
the generation of solidarity and an 
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implicit call for collective condemnation 
of the alleged atrocities that the Liyu 
police are committing, but this escalates 
sharply with the unambiguous demand 
for the ‘persecution’ of ‘the perpetrators’, 
‘wherever at anytime’. The forceful 
rhetoric of the politics of mobilisation 
plays on the emotional currency rooted 
in clannism to re-create conflict – a 
potential which is further amplified when 
shared multiply. 
 
The transformative nature of the three 
politics 
The three politics of conflict recreation in 
Somali diasporic media are analytically 
distinct, but as the findings highlight, they 
are not always mutually exclusive. In 
other words, one politics can be found to 
‘progress’ onto another politics, or in 
some cases to multiply combine. Below 
is an example of how this progression 
can occur: 
Digil&Mirifle kaalinta uu ku lahaa 
dowladdii militeriga ahayd ee jirtey 
21-ka sano ma ahayn kaalin u 
qalanta. Digil&Mirifle laga soo 
bilaabo 1991-da dagaaladii 
sokeeye markii ay dalka ka 
bilowdeen oo dhibaatada ugu 
badneyd ay ku dhacdey bulshada 
Digil&Mirifle wuxuu muujiyey isku 
duubni, wada tashi iyo dadaal 
badan oo uu ku doonayey in uu ka 
tashado masiirkiisa aayihiisa uuna 
sameysto dowlad goboleed uu 
hogaanka u hayo waxaa 
dadaaladaasi ka mid ah 
Shirweynihii MAAY NIING DANG EH 
oo dowladdii ka soo baxdey uu 
hogaaminayey AVV Xasan Sheekh 
Ibraahim. Hadana xalka wuxuu ku 
jiraa In la abaabulo shirweyne u 
gaar ah wax garadka Digil&Mirifle 
oo lagu xalinayo loogana heshiiyo 
khalalkii iyo ismaan dhaafkii 
gogoshii la furay20/01/2013 ku 
yimid. 
(Translation: the Digil & Mirifle clan 
did not get a worthy share in the 
military government that lasted 21 
years. When the civil war broke out 
in 1991, the Digil & Mirifle people 
faced the biggest backlash but we 
stood together in unity and we 
engaged in dialogues with each 
other to find ways to manage our 
affairs. These efforts bore fruit and 
we held a big conference called 
Maay Niing Dang Eh and at the 
conclusion of that conference, we 
formed our own regional 
administration led by advocate 
Hassan Sheikh Ibrahim. The 
solution now lies in organising 
another big conference where the 
disagreements that came from the 
meeting we had on 20/01/2013 
are resolved.) (Ogaden.com archive 
accessed September 2013) 
The article begins with the politics of 
non-recognition – outlining that the clan 
didn’t feel they received a fair share of 
the political power-sharing under the 
Siyad Barre regime. This is then followed 
by the politics of solidarity – highlighting 
the brunt of violence felt by the clan as a 
consequence of the civil war, and the 
memory that this didn’t deter them from 
coming together as a clan. Finally, it is 
noted how these efforts resulted in a 
wide consultation-based conference that 
led to the formation of a regional 
administration, and the solution 
advocated for their problems is the 
organisation of another conference to 
resolve previously unsettled 
disagreements. As a typical case 
example, we can see the direction of 
‘progression’ from the politics of non-
recognition to solidarity and then 
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mobilisation. However, it is important to 
recognise that the politics of mobilisation 
here is non-violent – a call for discussion 
rather than, as in the previous 
Ogaden.com example, aggressive or 
oppressive acts. Whilst we have seen the 
potential for conflict recreation in the 
politics of non-recognition, solidarity and 
mobilisation, it should also be 
acknowledged that this is not a 
necessary outcome of their deployment. 
Conflict management or even the 
suppression of conflict may be 
possibilities inherent to these dynamics 
of the diasporic media conflict discourse.  
 
Conclusion  
Diaspora communities have seen their 
political weight grow in the 20th and 21st 
centuries (Demmers 2011) and this is 
partially related to the changing patterns 
of conflict and the increasing flexibility 
and speed of technology and 
transportation, global human mobility 
and connections. However, the argument 
often brought forth by scholars of 
globalisation that groups are much less 
territorially bounded needs further 
scrutiny. The opportunities presented by 
globalisation in fact open greater 
possibilities for territorially-bounded 
connections, facilitated by online 
platforms, where people who are 
attached to particular homeland 
territories engage with one another 
politically in ways that can translate to 
offline activities. In the Somali case, there 
is a deeply-entrenched imagined 
connection to the homeland territories 
that is reinforced and fortified by 
diasporic media. Diasporic media play a 
pivotal role in enabling the advancement 
of political and ideological agendas with 
clannism being at the core. 
Current academic discourse regarding 
diasporic media often centres around its 
capabilities to help immigrants preserve 
their identities and maintain ties with 
their homeland. It is considered to be 
responding to the specific needs and 
conditions of immigrant communities 
(Bailey et al. 2007), as well as allowing a 
transnational bond to be created with 
countries of origin and therefore to 
sustain ethnic, national and religious 
identities and cultures (Aksoy and Robins 
2003: 93). While these notions hold 
much truth, diasporic media is doing 
more than that. This particularly requires 
attention when the diaspora community 
in question is connected to a homeland 
in conflict. Diasporic media enable the 
diaspora community to attain and exert 
power and prominence in the homeland 
by providing a platform that showcases 
their political, financial, social, and 
human capital, facilitating the 
occurrence of diasporated conflicts. The 
three politics I have outlined 
demonstrate how diasporic media can 
reproduce ideas of existing inequality, 
exclusion and marginalisation. It can be 
a tool to invoke solidaristic inclinations 
and most dangerously, diasporic media 
is used to mobilise existing hatred and 
tensions that can quite easily culminate 
in violent outbreaks. Together and 
separately the three politics of non-
recognition, solidarity and mobilisation 
showcase how diasporic media can lead 
to conflict re-creation, but also, more 
hopefully, that a diasporated conflict is 
not a necessary or inevitable outcome of 
their deployment.  
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